EVELEIGH, J.

The sole issue in this writ of error is whether the plaintiff in error, State Marshal Lisa H. Stevenson (plaintiff), was entitled to a fee for copies of a complaint handled in connection with her service of process in a civil action pursuant to General Statutes § 52-261 (a)(2),1 despite the fact that she did not personally make the copies. We conclude that the defendant in error, the trial court, improperly denied the plaintiff's request for fees and, accordingly, we grant the writ of error.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. The named plaintiff in the underlying action, Ernest Francis, brought a declaratory judgment action in the judicial district of Hartford against all 185 members of the Connecticut General Assembly, including the named defendant, John W. Fonfara. Francis sought and received a waiver of the entry fee and the process server's service fees pursuant to Practice Book § 8-2,2 including a fee for copies pursuant to § 52-261(a)(2). As the result of this waiver, the state, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-259b,3 was responsible for paying the process server's fees. After receiving a box from Francis with a sufficient quantity of copies to serve all 185 defendants, the plaintiff inquired with the office of the attorney general and received direction on how to address the service of process. Thereafter, the plaintiff properly effectuated service on all 185 defendants by leaving process for each with an associate attorney general, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-64.4 The plaintiff did not make the copies; Francis' son had them made at his expense. The copies complied, however, with the requirements of § 52-64 in that the plaintiff confirmed that each was exactly the same as the original, and thereon endorsed her attestation that each was a true copy of the original. Subsequently, the plaintiff submitted an invoice claiming fees of, inter alia, $900 for copies of the complaint.5

Thereafter, the trial court conducted a hearing on its own motion to review the fees charged by the plaintiff. The trial court subsequently issued a memorandum of decision in which it allowed the plaintiff's requested service, mileage, and endorsement fees, but disallowed the $900 fee for copies. This writ of error followed.6

The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly disallowed the fee for copies because, although the trial court properly determined that § 52-261(a)(2) was ambiguous, it failed to consider relevant and compelling legislative history when it considered extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute. The plaintiff contends that the legislative history demonstrates a clearly expressed intent for process servers to be paid the fee for copies, regardless of whether they actually make the copies. The trial court now contends, contrary to its memorandum of decision, that § 52-261(a)(2) is plain and unambiguous when read in context. According to the trial court, § 52-261(a) requires payment only for services actually performed, including the making of copies. Therefore, the trial court further contends that, pursuant to General Statutes § 1-2z,7 we may not consider extratextual sources to determine legislative intent, but must enforce the plain meaning of the statute. The trial court further responds that, even if we find that the language of § 52-261(a)(2) is not plain and unambiguous, it nevertheless properly exercised its discretion in refusing to grant the requested fee for copies. We agree with the plaintiff and conclude that the fee for copies is not contingent upon the process server personally making the copies.8

Whether § 52-261(a)(2) entitles a process server to the fee for copies, even if she has not personally made the copies, is a question of statutory interpretation "over which we exercise plenary review.. . . The principles that govern statutory construction are well established. When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.. . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.. . . In seeking to determine that meaning . . . § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extra-textual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324, 332-33, 984 A.2d 684 (2009). "The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tayco Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 294 Conn. 673, 679, 986 A.2d 290 (2010).

Section 52-261(a) provides in relevant part: "The following fees shall be allowed and paid . . . (2) for copies of writs and complaints, exclusive of endorsements, one dollar per page, not to exceed a total amount of nine hundred dollars in any particular matter. . . ." The trial court now contends that the only reasonable interpretation of the statute is that the process server claiming the statutory fee for copies personally must make the copies in order to be paid, because to conclude otherwise would lead to the absurd result that the fee could be paid for doing absolutely nothing. The plaintiff contends that it would be reasonable to conclude that the fee is due regardless of who makes the copies, because the fee for copies also compensates the process server for handling and reviewing the copies to ensure accuracy. We find both interpretations reasonable, and, accordingly, we conclude that the statute is ambiguous.

It is significant that this subdivision of the statute does not employ a gerund, as other subdivisions of the statute do, to specify for which act, if any, compensation shall be paid. For example, almost all of the other subdivisions of § 52-261(a) suggest a necessary action to qualify for the fee, such as "taking," "service," "removal," "levy," "causing," "committing," and "summoning and attending. . . ."9 Subdivision (2) of § 52-261(a) does not provide a fee "for making copies," "for copying" or "for ensuring the accuracy of copies," nor does it expressly reference expense reimbursement, as do subdivisions (5), (7), (8) and (10) of the statute.10 Only one other subdivision is similarly silent as to action; General Statutes § 52-261(a)(3); and provides fees "for endorsements, forty cents per page or fraction thereof. . . ."

In accordance with the requirements of § 1-2z, we also look to related statutes in construing § 52-261, which provide for payment for fees and expenses of persons serving civil process. Chapter 896, General Statutes § 52-45a et seq., governs civil process. Chapter 896 requires that "a proper officer" must serve on each defendant a "true and attested copy" of process.11 See, e.g., General Statutes §§ 52-57, 52-59b, 52-59c, 52-63 and 52-64. Nowhere in that chapter, however, is there a requirement that copies be made by the process server. Because it is clear that a copy of the complaint must be "true and attested," but the statutes are silent as to any requirement of who must make a copy, it is reasonable to conclude that the statutory fee for copies is intended to compensate the process server for handling and reviewing each copy to ensure that it is a true copy of the original, regardless of whether the copy was made by the process server. Contrary to the trial court's contention that making the copy is the only plausible task related to the service of copies of complaints and writs, handling and ensuring that a copy is true are acts required of the process server for each copy, regardless of whether the process server makes the copy.

Although this analysis strongly indicates that the fee for copies is compensation for handling and ensuring copies of complaints and writs are true, whatever that may entail, and therefore in compliance with chapter 896, we nevertheless acknowledge that the interpretation advanced by the trial court is reasonable, as well. Because it is clear that the legislature can indicate a necessary action, or condition payment on the showing of incurred expenses, it is reasonable to conclude, as the plaintiff now contends, that the fee for copies is to compensate the process server for handling copies of writs and complaints, regardless of whether the copies were made by the process server. Because the fee is calculated per page of each copy, it is also reasonable to conclude, as the trial court contends, that it is not a fee for handling and delivery, but compensation for expenses incurred in creation of each copy. Accordingly, we conclude that the statute is subject to multiple competing reasonable interpretations, and accordingly is ambiguous. Therefore, in accordance with § 1-2z, we review the legislative history of § 52-261.

In 1981, the legislature adopted an amendment to § 52-261 that, inter alia, increased the fee for copies from sixty cents per page to $1 per page. See Public Acts 1981, No. 81-80, § 1. The role of the process server and the fee for copies were expressly discussed, first at a judiciary committee hearing,12 and later on the floor of the House of Representatives.13 In both sessions, there was a clear legislative intent expressed that, in accordance with the custom and practice then existing, the fee for copies be paid regardless of who actually makes the copies, and as compensation for the process server's job of ensuring the accuracy of the copies. Our review of the remaining legislative history and genealogy of the statute has revealed no evidence to support a contrary interpretation.14 Such clear evidence of legislative intent, particularly when considered in concert with the weight of the textual evidence supplied by chapter 896, leaves no doubt that the fee for copies under § 52-261(a)(2) is not contingent upon the process server's making the copies.

The trial court contends, however, that it retains discretion in awarding fees for service of process and urges us to affirm its refusal to order the fee for copies as an exercise of that discretion. The plaintiff responds that the trial court's interpretation of § 52-261(a)(2) was a misapplication of the law and thereby constitutes an abuse of discretion. We agree with the plaintiff. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court's decision to deny the requested fee for copies was an exercise of discretion, rather than a misapplication of the law.

In determining whether a trial court may exercise its discretion in determining the fee for copies, or whether our interpretation of the statute compels the court to award the fee for copies, we note that § 52-261(a) provides in relevant part that "[t]he following fees shall be allowed and paid. . . ." (Emphasis added.) "[A]lthough we have often stated [that] [d]efinitive words, such as must or shall, ordinarily express legislative mandates of a nondirectory nature . . . we also have noted that the use of the word shall, though significant, does not invariably establish a mandatory duty. . . . Furthermore, a requirement stated in affirmative terms unaccompanied by negative words, as in the present case, generally is not viewed as mandatory." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 744, 865 A.2d 428 (2005). "While we generally will not look for interpretative guidance beyond the language of the statute when the words of that statute are plain and unambiguous. . . our past decisions have indicated that the use of the word shall, though significant, does not invariably create a mandatory duty. . . . The test we have adopted for determining whether such a statutory requirement is mandatory or directory is whether the prescribed mode of action is of the essence of the thing to be accomplished, or in other words, whether it relates to matter material or immaterial—to matters of convenience or of substance. . . . If it is a matter of convenience, the statutory provision is directory; if it is a matter of substance, the statutory provision is mandatory. . . . A statutory provision that is directory prescribes what shall be done but does not invalidate action upon a failure to comply." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall Manor Owner's Assn. v. West Haven, 212 Conn. 147, 152-53, 561 A.2d 1373 (1989).

In light of our preceding analysis, the use of the word shall in § 52-261 is sufficiently plain and unambiguous that further analysis to determine the nature of the duty is unnecessary. The statute provides for payment of specific fees for the service of process and, where the court has discretion in determining the amount to be paid, the court's discretion is expressed clearly in the statutory text. For example, § 52-261(a) provides in relevant part: "[F]or summoning grand jurors, such [process server] shall receive only such [process server's] actual expenses and such reasonable sum for services as are taxed by the court. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Section 52-261(a) provides in relevant part: "The following fees shall be allowed and paid . . . (5) for the removal and custody of such liquors so seized, reasonable expenses, and twenty dollars. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, it is plain that the legislature intended that a process server has a right to be paid a specified fee for all pages of copies of writs and complaints served, but that the court has discretion to determine a reasonable fee for a variety of other services.

We have previously held that a trial court had abused its discretion, in the context of an equitable action, by awarding excessive process server mileage fees under § 52-261(a). Danbury v. Dana Investment Corp., 249 Conn. 1, 29-30, 730 A.2d 1128 (1999).15 Danbury is distinguishable because in equitable actions the court must exercise its discretion in awarding costs.16 Not only is the present matter at law rather than in equity, but the issue is not the awarding of costs, but the calculation of them. In Danbury, we did not examine the court's calculation of the fee to determine whether it conformed with § 52-261. Accordingly, any reliance upon our analysis of the § 52-261(a) mileage fee in Danbury for the proposition that the calculation of fees for copies under § 52-261(a)(2) is discretionary, is misplaced.

The writ of error is granted, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to award the plaintiff the requested fee for copies of $900.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.